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[infowar.de] USA wollen mit Flugblättern auf Iraks B/C-Waffen-Kommandeure zielen
Infowar.de, http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/~bendrath/liste.html
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Interessanter Aspekt des Command&Control Warfare (C2W) bzw. Infowar:
Saddam Hussein hat angeblich seinen Kommandeuren schon jetzt den Befehl
gegeben, B- und C-Waffen gegen Invasionstruppen der USA einzusetzen im
Falle eines Angriffs. Die Folge: C2W (Zerstörung der irakischen
C2-Struktur) bringt hier nichts mehr, weil keine weiteren Kommandos aus
Bagdad mehr nötig sind. Also planen die USA selber eine Art "Kommando"
über diese Truppen auszuüben, indem sie massiv direkt bedroht werden.
Man muss nur noch herausfinden, wie man diese Kommunikation am besten
bewerkstelligt. Klassische Infowar-Aufgabe, Abteilung PsyOps.
RB
U.S. Effort Aimed At Iraqi Officers
Stopping Biological Weapons Is the Goal
By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, September 30, 2002; Page A01
The Pentagon is preparing a campaign aimed at deterring Iraqi officers
from
firing chemical or biological weapons during a U.S. invasion because
intelligence officials believe President Saddam Hussein has given field
commanders conditional authority to use the weapons in the event of an
attack, according to defense and intelligence officials.
The effort would include massive leafleting of Iraqi military positions
--
a tactic used by U.S. forces during the Gulf War in 1991 -- but also
might
employ covert techniques that would enable the U.S. message to reach
Iraqi
commanders, the officials said.
Final authority to use weapons of mass destruction has resided with
Hussein. But the Iraqi president's knowledge that the United States
would
seek to take down Iraqi command centers and communications systems at
the
outset of any military strike means he has likely already given
authority
for firing chemical and biological weapons to his most loyal commanders
in
the field, the officials said. They said Hussein issued similar orders
before the Gulf War.
As a result, the sources said, the Pentagon plans to appeal directly to
these officers not to use the weapons. One of the biggest challenges
before
military planners is determining which Iraqi military units can be
encouraged to defect in the event of a U.S. invasion and how to
communicate
with them, defense officials have said.
A British intelligence report released Tuesday by Prime Minister Tony
Blair
said Iraq could deploy nerve gas and anthrax weapons on 45 minutes'
notice.
It also said Hussein may have already delegated authority to order use
of
such weapons to his youngest son, Qusai, who leads the Republican Guard
--
elite units that control deployed weapons of mass destruction.
The Pentagon's campaign was signaled recently by Defense Secretary
Donald
H. Rumsfeld. Testifying before the House Armed Services Committee,
Rumsfeld
said, "Wise Iraqis will not obey orders to use WMD [weapons of mass
destruction]. . . . The United States will make clear at the outset that
those who are not guilty of atrocities can play a role in the new Iraq.
But
if WMD is used, all bets are off."
Rumsfeld added that if the order to use chemical or biological weapons
were
made by Hussein, "that does not necessarily mean his orders would be
carried out. He might not have anything to lose, but those beneath him
in
the chain of command most certainly would have a great deal to lose."
A Pentagon official said Rumsfeld's comments "are at least the start of
telling them we are serious."
After the Gulf War, coalition force interrogators learned that Hussein
had
decided ahead of time to give commanders the go-ahead to use chemical
weapons if Baghdad's communications were interrupted.
One administration source said the Iraqi president issued specific
orders
to use the weapons if "the allies were winning the ground war and they
had
crossed a line due west of the city of Al-Amarah," which is 200 miles
south
of Baghdad. Iraqi unit commanders were also told they should employ the
weapons against Iranian forces if they crossed the border during the war
and moved into Iraq's Maysan Province, where Al-Amarah is located.
Although Iraq's chemical artillery shells and warheads were deployed
during
the war, they were not used. U.S. officials now believe this was because
the United States had repeatedly cautioned Iraq before the fighting
started
that use of such weapons would draw an immediate and possibly
overwhelming
response that would topple Hussein from power.
One reason the Pentagon has adopted a plan to dissuade Iraqi officers
from
ordering the use of chemical or biological weapons is that, unlike in
1991,
this deterrent has been rendered moot by the administration's decision
to
make removing Hussein the goal of any military action.
Whether a plan to deter Iraqi commanders from employing the weapons will
work is a matter of disagreement among military experts. The Republican
Guard units that control the weapons are run by Hussein's most loyal
officers.
"They will face a short-term or a long-term problem," one former senior
intelligence official said. "We may come after them when the fighting is
over. But there may be a Saddam loyalist with a gun who is threatening
to
kill him right away if he doesn't follow orders."
Judith Yaphe, an Iraq specialist at the National Defense University,
said
that in 1991, according to documents found after the war, Hussein had
tried
to persuade his commanders to use the weapons because they would be
killed
anyway. Also, Hussein had placed loyalists with the commanders to
enforce
his wishes. "The question is, are they still there?" she said.
Richard Russell, a CIA area analyst who specialized in Iraq and is now
at
the National Defense University, said the effort to deter individual
commanders "makes sense as an attempt." But he noted that Iraqi
operational
security was very good in the Gulf War and "you have to assume it is
much
better now."
After Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, U.S. officials talked openly of
American forces making preparations for waging combat in a chemical
environment. Then-Secretary of State James A. Baker III told Iraqi
Foreign
Minister Tariq Aziz that Hussein's government would be endangered if
such
weapons were used. Then-Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney hinted that
if
such an attack took place against Israel, that country might respond
with
nuclear weapons.
In the war's aftermath, U.S. intelligence officials learned that Iraq
had
been deterred from using chemical weapons by the threat of massive
retaliation. Iraqi artillery units armed with chemical shells were
segregated from the rest of the forces and chemical munitions were never
moved to Kuwait and never moved toward the front as coalition forces
approached, and in some cases breached, the Iraq-Kuwait border.
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