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Stratfor Weekly: Davos, Multilateralism and the Crisis of the Alliance
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Davos, Multilateralism and the Crisis of the Alliance
Summary
"Multilateralism" was the main theme at the annual meeting of the
World Economic Forum, recently concluded in Davos. For European
states, the first half of the 20th century was a time of
unprecedented savagery. In European minds, the culprit was
nationalism -- or, more precisely, the unilateral pursuit of
national interest. Multilateralism -- the creation of
multinational institutions and a multinational mode of thought --
is the Europeans' response to their history. It has become a
moral category. The United States, however, has a very different
history and a very different set of fears. The United States has
no historical reason for fearing its own nationalism, but it does
have reason to fear inaction. The U.S. need to deal with Islamic
radicalism collides with the European fear that the shattering of
multilateralism once again will release the demons of
nationalism.
Analysis
Stratfor was present at the annual meeting of the World Economic
Forum in Davos, Switzerland, during the week of Jan. 23. The
meeting was fascinating, but not necessarily for the reasons the
organizers intended. At Davos, you could hear history creaking in
the woodwork -- the strains of the old international systems
beginning to splinter under the weight of new realities. It was a
meeting in which many participants expressed substantial anger at
the United States and fear of the future, particularly over the
coming war with Iraq. Underlying all of this, however, was the
belief that ultimately there was nothing broken that could not be
repaired.
Those present at Davos were far from representative of the world
or even of the world's elite. The World Economic Forum is an
organization comprising business leaders who head the major
global organizations. But many others attend the annual
conference: Senior government leaders -- including several heads
of state from each continent; armies of ministers, assistant
ministers and minor non-ministers; officials from multinational
organizations like the World Bank and United Nations; leaders of
various non-governmental organizations, such as Amnesty
International; and representatives from think-tanks. Finally,
there are hordes of prestigious academics.
This does not necessarily mean a vast divergence of opinions. The
World Economic Forum has an embedded ideology, developed in the
1980s and forged in the1990s. The organization believes that the
business community, united and combined with these other
constituencies, can dramatically improve the human condition
through good will and good policies. Rising to its heights during
the 1990s, it held that economics had superceded geopolitics as
the driver of human events. At root, most of its members either
still believe this or wish this were true. At the recent
conference, it was not just the United States that was resented -
- the real resentment was at the betrayal by history, and an
underlying commitment to reversing that process.
What was present was that segment of the international elite that
is committed to preserving the international system as it was
prior to Sept. 11, 2001. The world view at Davos was of those who
remain committed to the world and the alliances founded by
American power after World War II -- and adopted by much of the
rest of the world since then. Resistance to the idea that this
world now could be defunct was intense, as much among the
American representatives as among the rest of the world. It was a
meeting in which two concepts, never expressed clearly but always
present, dominated: Preserve what is; restore what has been lost.
The NGOs and the think-tanks, combined with the multinational
organizations, form the intellectual center of gravity at Davos.
Combined with representatives of the European Union, they
constitute a powerful phalanx of thought. They are strongly
supported by most of the academics present, including those from
the United States. Other blocs are present. The Asians spent
their time thinking about economics, trying to drive away
thoughts of international conflict. The Asians also wistfully
recalled their former days of glory -- assuring everyone that the
glory lives on in China, and hoping that no one posed any serious
security or geopolitical questions to them. Muslim leaders,
seeking to block U.S. adventures in Iraq, aligned with the
Europeans, although their mindset was far from that of Brussels
on most issues.
The main thrust of the conference can be summed up in one term:
multilateralism. Multilateralism, in the context of Davos, is an
attack on the legitimacy of the United States in exercising
sovereign national rights outside the framework of international
institutions. The U.N., International Monetary Fund, EU and
various multinational NGOs are multilateral organizations. This
means two things: First, they are the creations of more than one
nation; second, their mission is to bridge the gap between
nations, thereby reducing conflict. There is an ethical
imperative here. The view is that nationalism is the problem that
drove the world to catastrophe in two world wars -- and that
multinational organizations are more than simply useful
contrivances that serve the interests of various nations; they
are moral enterprises whose very existence helps save the world
from conflict.
This is very much the European view, and it is understandable.
European nationalism led the Continent and the world into
unprecedented exercises of barbarism throughout the first half of
the twentieth century. The Europeans, deeply traumatized by the
horror that clearly ran just beneath the surface of their
civilization and which they no longer could deny, grabbed hold of
the U.S.-inspired system of multinational relations and expanded
on it for two reasons. One was the explicit mission (such as
economic development), and the second was the moral mission,
which was to limit the autonomy of European nations in order to
prevent another outbreak of European nationalism. NATO and the EU
were useful as ends in themselves, but their deepest purpose was
to prevent the outbreak of another Franco-German war by tying the
two nations together in a single network of relations.
For European leaders, multilateralism is a moral category,
designed to restrain the brutal consequences of nationalism. In
the distrust of national ambition and their a priori commitment
to entities like the IMF, World Bank and multiple U.N. agencies -
- as well as purely European contrivances -- the Europeans are
joined by the functionaries of international humanitarian and
human rights NGOs, as well as diplomats and public officials of
many countries -- especially European -- for whom the rhetoric of
multinationalism and multilateralism has become the common
currency of public discourse.
The United States has a very different experience of nationalism
and therefore a very different view of multilateralism. From the
U.S. point of view, World Wars I and II were exercises in
European savagery; it fell to the United States to save Europe
from itself. However, the United States never saw itself as
responsible for Europe's disease, nor did it see itself as
susceptible to it. Washington was not afraid of its own
nationalist tendencies. Americans believed that the Europeans
would not behave as civilized human beings unless they were
forced into institutions that limited their sovereignty and
behavior. In the American view, the lesson of the 20th century
was precisely the opposite: The United States could be trusted to
behave responsibly without institutional constraints. During the
Cold War, an American might argue, nuclear holocaust was
prevented precisely because the United States unilaterally
managed its nuclear strategy. Had the European statesmen of 1914
or 1939 had nuclear weapons, or had the weapons been held
multilaterally, another holocaust might have followed.
>From the U.S. viewpoint, it is altogether reasonable that the
Europeans demand multilateralism for themselves. It is not
reasonable to demand it of the United States. The current
alliance structure has two purposes: One is to facilitate the
effective defense of the West, the other is to create a framework
for controlling European excesses. The alliance now is hindering
rather than facilitating defense and, one would hope, the
Europeans are now sufficiently chastened and mature to restrain
themselves within their own multilateral systems. NATO's
consensus system should not be permitted to impede U.S. war-
making strategy, particularly when it permits countries that
commit and risk little or nothing to control the United States,
which is committing and risking much. From Washington's
perspective, NATO might have outlived its usefulness.
At Davos, Secretary of State Colin Powell made the argument for
the United States, although he left much unsaid. In general, the
U.S. academic and NGO attendees sided with the Europeans, while
the business leaders maintained a muted tone, focusing on the
effects a war might have on the economy. There is a self-
selection process at Davos that results in a certain stratum of
U.S. views being represented while others are not. But it was
more interesting than that. There was continual talk about
European opposition to U.S. "unilateralism," but the Europeans
were deeply split as well. The Spanish government has come in on
Washington's position, and the Italian government is close. Most
of Eastern Europe is siding with the United States. And of course
the British government stands with the United States. Germany and
France do not speak for Europe; they speak for themselves in a
deeply divided Europe. The divisions within Europe did not come
through clearly.
In a sense, that's reasonable. Many Americans oppose President
George W. Bush's policies, and many Europeans oppose the Franco-
German position. But this is more than a question of public
opinion at any given period. The fact is that, at the deepest
intellectual and moral level, a divide is opening between Europe
and the United States. And with that gap, the entire edifice of
the post-War alliance structure is cracking apart.
>From a practical point of view, we can already see the shifting
alliances. What Turkey or Saudi Arabia or India do has a direct,
potential effect on the United States. What Germany or France do
really doesn't matter that much in a practical sense. Geography
defines interests, and the geography of Europe has little to do
with contemporary U.S. interests and fears in 2003. The Fulda Gap
is infinitely less important than the Shatt al-Arab to the United
States. History has turned, and the incomprehension and anger of
the Europeans at Davos is directed less at the United States than
at a lack of ability to control events.
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