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[infowar.de] Al Qaeda's Information War
Über den Autor (US-Oberst der Reserve, Romanautor und TV-Kommentator):
<http://www.creators.com/opinion_Shell.cfm?pg=biography.html&columnsname=aba>
"What makes the small and anonymous appear powerful and strong? In the
21st century, intense media coverage magnifies the terrorists'
capabilities. This suggests that winning the global war against Islamist
terror ultimately means accomplishing two things: denying the
terrorists' weapons of mass destruction and curbing what is currently Al
Qaeda's greatest strategic capability: media magnification and
occasional media enhancement of its bombing campaigns and political
theatrics."
<http://www.creators.com/opinion_show.cfm?columnsName=aba>
Al Qaeda's Information War
by Austin Bay
July 12, 2005
Terrorism as practiced by Al Qaeda -- and, for that matter Saddamist
killers in Iraq -- is 21st century information warfare. Terrorists don't
simply target London and Baghdad, they target the news media.
Al Qaeda understands that our media craves the spectacular. But don't
place all the blame on headline writers and TV producers. Like sex,
violence sells, and Al Qaeda has suckered audiences by providing hideous
violence.
At the moment, the truly biggest story on the planet is democratic
political change in the Middle East, beginning with Iraq. It'shuge
history, and a looming political disaster for tyrants and terrorists.
When Western audiences decide that this is the real news of our era --
and it is that -- Al Qaeda will be dealt a death blow.
German strategic theorist Carl von Clausewitz called war "politics by
other means." Physical intimidation and physical threat are implicit in
that analysis. Al Qaeda's terror campaigns certainly rely on
intimidation and threat, but Al Qaeda is an extremely limited
organization. Its military limitations are obvious. As U.S. Central
Command's Gen. John Abizaid recently noted, Al Qaeda has yet to win a
military engagement with U.S. forces at or above the platoon level. (A
platoon has approximately 30 troops.)
This also holds true for Taliban guerrillas in Afghanistan and what
military analysts call the "former regime elements" (FRE -- i.e.,
pro-Saddam forces) in Iraq.
Al Qaeda doesn't have much in the way of education policies, beyond
bankrolling Islamist schools. Al Qaeda says it will redistribute the
wealth of corrupt Middle Eastern petro-sheiks. Though that is an
economic promise, it isn't a long-term economic plan.
Al Qaeda, however, understands the power of perceived grievance and the
appeal of Utopia. In the late 1990s, Osama bin Laden said Al Qaeda's
strategic goal was restoring the Islamic caliphate. Bin Laden expressed
a special hatred for Turkey's Kemal Ataturk, who ended the caliphate in
1924.
History, going wrong for Islamist supremacists at least since the 16th
century, really failed when the caliphate dissolved. Though Al Qaeda's
timeline to Utopia remains hazy, once the caliphate returns, the
decadent modern world will fade, as Western power collapses -- and
presumably Eastern power, as well. (Islamists are active in China's
Sinkiang province.)
At some point, bin Laden-interpreted Islamic law will bring strict bliss
to the entire world. If this sounds vaguely like a Marxist "Workers
Paradise," that's no accident -- the communists also justified the
murder of millions pursuing their atheist Utopia.
The appeal to perceived grievance and promise of an Islamist utopia,
however, made Al Qaeda a regional information power in a Middle East
where political options were denied by tyrants. The 9-11 attacks made Al
Qaeda a global information power -- they were an international
advertising campaign. Four years later, Al Qaeda remains a strategic
information power, but little else. In ever other measure of power and
success, Al Qaeda is very weak.
Maj. Gen. Doug Lute, operations officer for CENTCOM, argues that IEDs
(improvised explosive devices, bombs like those used in London) are
"perfect asymmetric warfare weapons" for 21st century terrorists.
("Asymmetric warfare" pits mismatched enemies -- the weak side tries to
avoid its own destruction, while targeting the strong side's political
or military vulnerabilities.)
"IEDs are relatively effective," Lute says -- meaning when they go off,
they usually kill and wound. "IEDs are cheap to make. They are available
(i.e., explosives and triggers, as well as skills required to assemble
them)." But, moreover: "IEDs are anonymous. This makes them the enemy's
most effective weapon because they are really an IO (information
operations) weapon. They intimidate, sow fear, but do so without certain
identification."
Anonymity means "the terrorists can be a very small group" of people or
politically weak organization, Lute adds.
What makes the small and anonymous appear powerful and strong? In the
21st century, intense media coverage magnifies the terrorists'
capabilities. This suggests that winning the global war against Islamist
terror ultimately means accomplishing two things: denying the
terrorists' weapons of mass destruction and curbing what is currently Al
Qaeda's greatest strategic capability: media magnification and
occasional media enhancement of its bombing campaigns and political
theatrics.
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