Suche innerhalb des Archivs / Search the Archive All words Any words

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

[] einige News zur Restrukturierung der US Intelligence Agencies,

Wanja hat einige interessante Quellen zusammengetragen, darunter auch
zwei Interviews, die er selber geführt hat und die eine ausführliche
Lektüre lohnen. 

Eine Anmerkung:
"US combatant commanders might soon get the authority to approve
Information Operations and thereby it will be possible to include IO
into battle plans which will make IO far more effective. This will be an
important change as IO will not longer just be 'Special Information
Operations'." (WEN in der Einleitung)
Ich bin nicht sicher, ob Wanja da nicht IO und CNA verwechselt. CNA war
bisher von gesonderten Genehmigungsprozeduren abhängig, normale IO
(Psyops etc.) m.W. nicht. Siehe die Joint Doctrin for Information
Operations, <>


-------- Original Message --------
Betreff: [INFOCON] Experts Urge Restructuring of US Intelligence
Datum: Wed, 15 Oct 2003 12:41:07 +0100
Von: "Wanja Eric Naef [IWS]" <w -
 naef -!
- iwar -
 org -
Rückantwort: w -
 naef -!
- iwar -
 org -
An: infocon -!
- iwar -
 org -

  [Intelligence is one of the best 'weapons' in the global war on 
terrorism. Hence, the US needs to reform its intelligence agencies and 
pay special attention to human intelligence. Furthermore, it needs to 
improve its analytical capabilities which have been deteriorating since 
the end of the Cold War. It is nice to have all the fancy technology, 
but unfortunately terrorists are quite good at changing their modus 
operandi so that only HUMINT can reach them. (For a brilliant article on 
terrorists' ability to change see 'From Pablo to Osama: 
Counter-terrorism Lessons from the War on Drugs' Survival 45:187-206).

In defence of Intel agencies: everyone knows about 9-11, but we will 
never know about the 99 times out of 100 when Intel agencies have been 
successful in preventing terror plots, ... so it is still difficult to 
judge their efficiency as only their failures are public known.

Nevertheless, as Intel becomes increasingly important in military 
operations (for example Computer Network Attacks can be very Intel 
intensive) the US should focus on enhancing and streamlining its Intel 
capabilities. This will help to effectively conduct network centric 
operations on tactical and operational levels whilst conducting effect 
based operations on an operational and higher levels.

At least there is some good news on another front: US combatant 
commanders might soon get the authority to approve Information 
Operations and thereby it will be possible to include IO into battle 
plans which will make IO far more effective. This will be an important 
change as IO will not longer just be 'Special Information Operations'.


Q: 13. You mention that intelligence is very important for IO. Do you 
think US intelligence agencies need to change in order to support such 

Kuehl: On a larger scale the American intelligence network is undergoing 
a fairly intense self-examination and examination from outside as well 
in terms of how it links together and does things. We are big and we 
have a plethora of intelligence organisations. The key question: first 
of all how do you link them together? The technology to do that is 
easier than the human part of it. There are turf issues involved. There 
are legal issues involved. For example, the FBI can gather information 
on an American citizen as part of a criminal investigation. If the NSA 
does this it becomes intelligence gathering and someone will go to jail 
for doing it.

So we have legal impediments within our system to do some of these 
things. It probably hinders a lot of things. Probably IO more so than 
naval warfare, but that is one of the prices you pay for having the 
democratic system. I mean nobody said democracy was clean and efficient 
and neat. There is a lot of friction and grey areas, but that is the 
price you pay for a system that has lots of checks and balances built 
into it.

Q: 10. Intelligence support is very important for Influence Operations? 
How do you think the US Intel community should change to provide better 
Intel support, especially cultural intelligence?

Dietz: There is not enough attention to the civilian composition of the 
countries of the world, particularly the media. There are no existing 
databases to my knowledge that tell you who owns what TV station, who 
owns what radio station, do these stations take commercial advertising 
and if so who are the biggest advertisers, what are the rates, who are 
the leading personalities and what are their backgrounds. This 
information is very difficult to get. You cannot necessarily go out on 
the Internet and find out how many TV stations there are in Azerbaijan. 
The issue of language proficiency is also important and it is difficult 
to collect intelligence when the collectors cannot employ the native 
language of the target. Having said that it strikes me as logical that 
the commercial attachés of particular embassies and consulates should be 
chartered with the collection of TV guides, radio scheduling, newspaper 
publishing data and whatever information is available to the public from 
open sources dealing with the nature of the communications media. I 
think right now this is really a black hole. And even in the commercial 
sector you do not see much of that information available, because it is 
kind of a ?follow the money thing?, i.e. that countries of the world 
that have very poor economies are typically the ones that have the most 
troubles and because they have poor economies they are not good venues 
for investments. If they are not good venues for investments there is 
not a lot of research in the media even though some of these countries 
would be the mostly locations for military intervention of one kind or 


Experts Urge Restructuring of US Intelligence Agencies
Gary Thomas
VOA, Washington
14 Oct 2003, 20:28 UTC

The commission investigating the terrorist attacks of September 11,2001 
is hearing a number of proposals, some of them from current and former 
top intelligence officials, about possible changes to the U.S. 
intelligence structure.

Former intelligence officials say the U.S. intelligence community was 
shaken to the core by the September 11 attacks. John MacGaffin, formerly 
the assistant Deputy Director of Operations at the CIA, says the attacks 
underscore the need for strengthened domestic intelligence.

"We have to have a proactive approach, and that is domestic 
intelligence," he said. "And that is intelligence gathering. And that is 
very difficult for Americans to contemplate. But if we don't do it, the 
bad guys are going to continue to beat us as they beat us in 9-11 
[September 11], which was truly an intelligence failure, a systemic 
failure of which multiple elements of our government bear


Former US Officials Recommend Changes in Intelligence Gathering 
Jim Malone VOA, Washington 14 Oct 2003, 19:01 UTC

Some former U.S. intelligence officials are urging major changes in 
intelligence-gathering in the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks on New 
York and Washington. The recommendations are being considered by the 
independent commission investigating the September 11 attacks.

Former CIA Director John Deutsch told the commission he would like to 
see foreign and domestic intelligence gathering combined under a single 
director of national intelligence.

"That separation of foreign and domestic intelligence collection places 
limits on the effectiveness of our intelligence, which I believe have to 
be removed in order to better combat terrorist threats," he said.

Currently, the CIA is responsible for foreign intelligence gathering 
while the FBI oversees domestic intelligence.


Foundations for Meta-Analysis
Developing a Taxonomy of Intelligence Analysis Variables
Rob Johnston


Editor?s Note: By distilling a list of the variables that affect 
analytic reasoning, the author aims to move the tradecraft of 
intelligence analysis closer to a science. A carefully prepared taxonomy 
can become a structure for heightening awareness of analytic biases, 
sorting available data, identifying information gaps, and stimulating 
new approaches to the understanding of unfolding events, ultimately 
increasing the sophistication of analytic judgments. The article is 
intended to stimulate debate leading to refinements of the proposed 
variables and the application of such a framework to analytic thinking 
among intelligence professionals.


 From Semaphore to Predator
Intelligence in the Internet Era
A. Denis Clift

During the Napoleonic Wars, the French revolutionized land-based 
communications with the erection of semaphore towers bearing rotating 
arms to fashion coded signals that could speed by line-of-sight from 
tower to tower along the coast and across the country at some 200 miles 
an hour. The British quickly followed suit in that new era of signals 
intelligence. Theft of the enemy?s semaphore codebooks became an 
important part of the business of war. [1]

During the war on terrorism in Afghanistan, ?Predator? unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs), flying lengthy missions at heights of some 25,000 feet, 
have been providing multihour surveillance of designated geography, 
installations, and activity. Tasking to the Predator, as well as 
electro-optical video and infrared images collected by its cameras, move 
near-instantaneously to and from the theater commanders and officials in 
Washington. Such communications flow through a secure network of ground 
stations and satellites, with part of the product traveling through a 
classified Internet counterpart. [2]


Congressional Reports: Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community 
Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 
In February 2002, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence agreed to conduct a 
Joint Inquiry into the activities of the U.S. Intelligence Community in 
connection with the terrorist attacks perpetrated against our nation on 
September 11, 2001. This report (available as both S. Rept. 107-351 and 
H. Rept. 107-792) consists of 832 pages that presents the joint 
inquiry?s findings and conclusions, an accompanying narrative, and a 
series of recommendations.

Information is the currency of victory on the battlefield.
GEN Gordon Sullivan, CSA (1993)

INFOCON Mailing List @
IWS - The Information Warfare Site

To subscribe, change your subscription or unsubscribe go to 

Liste verlassen: 
Mail an infowar -
 de-request -!
- infopeace -
 de mit "unsubscribe" im Text.