[infowar.de] Echelon EP-Bericht

[daly <daly -! - uni-muenster - de>]

Infowar.de - http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/~bendrath/liste.html

--------------------------- ListBot Sponsor --------------------------
Start Your Own FREE Email List at http://www.listbot.com/links/joinlb
----------------------------------------------------------------------

Hi!

Hier die Mindermeinung bzg. des Berichtes des EP zu Echelon. Courtesy of
cryptome.org:

Grüße,

John

http://cryptome.org/echelon-turco.htm

6 July 2001. Thanks to DN.
Date: Fri, 06 Jul 2001 13:05:42 +0200
From: "Maurizio Turco" <mturco -!
- europarl -
 eu -
 int>
To: <dn -!
- pipeline -
 com>
Subject: EP RESOLUTION ON ECHELON
Please find here the final resolution on Echelon adopted on 3 July by
the
European Parliament temporary Committee on Echelon and a Press Release.
The
resolution will then be approved in the plenary session of September.
Best regards.
Maurizio Turco
MEP
[Original Word document:
http://cryptome.org/Pressrelease-Echelon.doc
]
Maurizio Turco
MEP
PRESS RELEASE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT REPORT ON ECHELON / TURCO (LISTA BONINO):
THE REPORT OF AMNESIAS, UNCERTAINTIES, DECEITS
THE REPORT TAKES FOR GRANTED THE PROBABLE EXISTENCE OF THE ANGLO-SAXON
SYSTEM
AND OVERSHADOWS WHAT IS CERTAIN ABOUT GERMANY AND HOLLAND; IT SPEAKS ON
BEHALF
OF A PRESUMED "EUROPEAN" INDUSTRY WHILE IT SHUTS THE "EUROPEAN CITIZEN"
UP.
Strasburg 5 July 2001 ? statement of Maurizio Turco, MEP, President
of the Radical MEPs of the Lista Bonino and member of the Echelon
Committee
Coordinators (enclosed the minority opinion that will be annexed to the
final
report):
"The majority, on the one hand, has chosen to highlight the probable if
not
certain, but not documented, existence of the Anglo-Saxon system called
Echelon;
on the other hand, it censured the fact that Germany and Holland possess

and use the same technology ("systematic and at random interceptions
filtered
by a search engine"). A majority that ? though certain about the
existence
of Echelon - "forgets" however to sanction United Kingdom accused to
play
a double game with its European partners.
A majority that echoes a presumed violation of European industry
economic
interests while it "forgets" that some Member States usually intercept
citizens
of other Member States in defiance of "european
citizenship". Therefore Industry must be defended
by Europe and the citizen, on the contrary, left in the hands of his own

country that, in the name of national security, can freely intercept
citizens
of other Member States and abandon its own citizens at the mercy of the
European
partners? secret services.
In the explanatory statement, we can read between the lines the wish to
see
the "bad job" entrusted to a European Secret Service (Eurosecr?), as it
has
already been done with police (Europol) and judges (Eurojust). In this
way
citizens and thus also firms, some firms of some countries, will be put
at
the mercy of secret services of Third countries and Member States and of
the EU ones.
Our minority opinion ? that will be annexed to the Committee Report
? has 200 words as conceded by EP rules of procedure. Of course it does
not contain all that ought to be said and that we will say during the
debate
to be hold in the plenary session of September".
ECHELON REPORT
MINORITY OPINION of Maurizio Turco (Lista Emma Bonino)
A. While has been brought to the fore the probable existence of a
Anglo-Saxon system based on "systematic and at random interceptions
filtered
through a search engine", the fact that these technological
capacity is certainly used by Germany and Holland - and probably by
France
? has been missed out. Therefore ? as secret services in the
name of national security intercept without authorization foreign
communications
? some Member States snoop on the activities of other Member States
institutions, citizens and firms.
B. The development of cryptography, even if it favours the protection of

privacy, also entails the development of deciphering?s technical and
legal means, according to the indissoluble link between development of
cryptografic, crypto-analytic systems and interception techniques.
C. The solutions should thus be found in the political field:
- through a judicial and parliamentary control on interception and
surveillance
  activities of police, security and secret services;

- to put at end the proliferation of regulatory bodies (Schengen,
  Europol, the Customs Convention, etc.) working with different
standards of
  protection and free of any real democratic and judicial scrutiny.

- regulating ? following the highest standard and the jurisprudence
  of the ECHR ? the protection of European citizens privacy regarding
  the preventive intrusions of State control authorities and eliminating

  the current discriminations within the EU between citizens of
different Member
  States.
[Original Word document:
http://cryptome.org/Resolution_def_EN.doc
]
[The following appears to be the same as the motion distributed by
Torben
Lund, EuroParl member from Denmark: http://cryptome.org/echelon-epmr.htm

]
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION
European Parliament resolution on the existence of a global system for
the interception of private and commercial communications (ECHELON
interception
system)
The European Parliament,
? having regard to Parliament's decision of 5 July 2000 to set up a
  Temporary Committee on the ECHELON Interception System and the mandate
issued
  to the Temporary Committee,

? having regard to the EC Treaty, one objective of which is the
  establishment of a common market with a high level of competitiveness,


? having regard to Articles 11 and 12 of the Treaty on European Union,
  which impose on the Member States a binding requirement to enhance and
develop
  their mutual political solidarity,

? having regard to the Treaty on European Union, in particular Article
  6(2) thereof, which lays down the requirement that the EU must respect

  fundamental rights, and Title V thereof, which sets out provisions
governing
  the common foreign and security policy,

? having regard to Article 12 of the Universal Declaration
  of Human Rights,

? having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, Article
  7 of which lays down the right to respect for private and family life
and
  explicitly enshrines the right to respect for communications,

? having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), in
  particular Article 8 thereof, which governs the protection of private
life
  and the confidentiality of correspondence, and the many other
international
  conventions which provide for the protection of privacy,

? having regard to the work carried out by the Temporary Committee on
  the ECHELON Interception System, which held a large number of hearings
and
  meetings with experts of all kinds, and in particular with senior
representatives
  of the public and private sectors in the sphere of telecommunications
and
  data protection, with employees of intelligence and information
services,
  with journalists, with lawyers with expert knowledge of this area,
with members
  of the national parliaments of the Member States, etc.,

- having regard to the report on the existence of a global system for
the
  interception of private and commercial communications (ECHELON
interception
  system) drawn up by the Temporary Committee on the ECHELON
Interception System
  (A5-?./2001(),
The existence of a global system for intercepting private and commercial

communications (the ECHELON interception system)
A. whereas the existence of a global system for intercepting
communications,
operating by means of cooperation proportionate to their capabilities
among
the USA, the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand under the UKUSA
Agreement,
is no longer in doubt; whereas, in view of the evidence, and
the many statements which tally with each other and which come from a
very wide range of individuals and organisations, including American
sources, (it may be assumed that the system or parts of it
were, at least for some time, code-named ECHELON,
B. whereas there can now be no doubt that the purpose of the system is
to
intercept at the very least, private and commercial communications, and
not
military communications, although the analysis carried out in the report

has revealed that the technical capabilities of the system are probably
not
nearly as extensive as some sections of the media had assumed,
C. whereas, therefore, it is surprising that many senior Community
figures,
including European Commissioners, who gave evidence to the Temporary
Committee
claimed to be unaware of this phenomenon,
The limits of the interception system
D. whereas the surveillance system depends, in particular, upon
worldwide interception of satellite communications, although in areas
characterised by a high volume of communications only a very small
proportion
of those communications are transmitted by satellite; whereas this means

that the majority of communications cannot be intercepted by earth
stations,
but only by tapping cables and intercepting radio signals, something
which
- as the investigations carried out in connection with the report have
shown
- is possible only to a limited extent; whereas the numbers of personnel

required for the final analysis of intercepted communications imposes
further
restrictions; whereas, therefore, the UKUSA states have access to only a

very limited proportion of cable and radio communications and can
analyse
an even more limited proportion of those communications, and whereas,
further,
however extensive the resources and capabilities for the interception of

communications may be, the extremely high volume of traffic makes
exhaustive,
detailed monitoring of all communications impossible in practice,
The possible existence of other interception systems
E. whereas the interception of communications is a method of spying
commonly
employed by intelligence services, so that other states might also
operate
similar systems, provided that they have the required funds and the
right
locations; whereas France is the only EU Member State which is - thanks
to
its overseas territories - geographically and technically capable to
autonomously operate a global interception system and also possesses the
technical and
organisational infrastructure to do so; whereas there is also ample
evidence
that Russia is likely to operate such a system,
Compatibility with EU law
G. whereas, as regards the question of the compatibility of a system of
the
ECHELON type with EU law, it is necessary to distinguish between two
scenarios:
if a system is used purely for intelligence purposes, there is no
violation
of EU law, since operations in the interests of state security are not
subject
to the EC Treaty, but would fall under Title V of the Treaty on European

Union (CFSP), although at present that title lays down no provisions on
the
subject, so that no criteria are available; if, on the other hand, the
system
is abused for the purposes of gathering competitive intelligence, such
action
is at odds with the Member States? duty of loyalty and with the concept
of a common market based on free competition, so that a Member State
participating in such a system violates EC law,
H. having regard to the statements made by the Council at the plenary
sitting
of 30 March 2000 to the effect that ? the Council cannot agree
to the creation or existence of a telecommunications interception system

which does not comply with the rules laid down in the law of the Member
States
and which breaches the fundamental principles designed to safeguard
human
dignity?,
Compatibility with the fundamental right to respect for private life
(Article 8 of the ECHR)
I. whereas any interception of communications represents serious
interference
with an individual?s exercise of the right to privacy; whereas Article
8 of the ECHR, which guarantees respect for private life, permits
interference
with the exercise of that right only in the interests of national
security,
in so far as this is in accordance with domestic law and the provisions
in
question are generally accessible and lay down under what circumstances,

and subject to what conditions, the state may undertake such
interference;
whereas interference must be proportionate, so that competing interests
need
to be weighed up and, under the terms of the case law of the European
Court
of Human Rights, it is not enough that the interference should merely be

useful or desirable,
J. whereas an intelligence system which at random and permanently
intercepted
all communications would be in violation of the principle of
proportionality
and would not be compatible with the ECHR; whereas it would also
constitute
a violation of the ECHR if the rules governing the surveillance of
communications
lacked a legal basis, if the rules were not generally accessible or if
they
were so formulated that their implications for the individual were
unforeseeable
or if the interference was not proportionate; whereas most of the rules
governing
the activities of US intelligence services abroad are classified, so
that compliance with the principle of proportionality is at least
doubtful and
breaches of the principles of accessibility and forseeability laid down
by
the European Court of Human Rights probably occur,
K. whereas the Member States cannot circumvent the requirements imposed
on
them by the ECHR by allowing other countries' intelligence services,
which
are subject to less stringent legal provisions, to work on their
territory,
since otherwise the principle of legality, with its twin components of
accessibility and forseeability, would become a dead letter and the case

law of the European Court of Human Rights would be deprived of its
substance,
L. whereas, in addition, the lawful operations of intelligence services
are
consistent with fundamental rights only if adequate arrangements exist
for
monitoring them, in order to counterbalance the risks inherent in secret

activities performed by a part of the administrative apparatus; whereas
the
European Court of Human Rights has expressly stressed the importance of
an efficient system for monitoring intelligence operations, so that
there are
grounds for concern in the fact that some Member States do not have
parliamentary
monitoring bodies of their own responsible for scrutinising the secret
services,
Are EU citizens adequately protected against intelligence
services?
M. whereas the protection enjoyed by EU citizens depends on the legal
situation
in the individual Member States, which varies very substantially, and
whereas
in some cases parliamentary monitoring bodies do not even exist, so that

the degree of protection can hardly be said to be adequate; whereas it
is
in the fundamental interests of European citizens that their national
parliaments
should have a specific, formally structured monitoring committee
responsible
for supervising and scrutinising the activities of the intelligence
services;
whereas even where monitoring bodies do exist, there is a strong
temptation
for them to concentrate more on the activities of domestic intelligence
services,
rather than those of foreign intelligence services, since as a rule it
is
only the former which affect their own citizens; whereas it would be an
encouragement for proportionate interference practices, if intelligence
services
were obliged to notify a citizen whose communications have been
intercepted
of this fact afterwards, for instance five years after the interception
took
place,
N. whereas, in view of their size, satellite receiving stations cannot
be
built on the territory of a state without its consent,
O. whereas, in the event of cooperation between intelligence services
under
the CFSP or in the areas of justice and home affairs, the institutions
must
introduce adequate measures to protect European citizens,
Industrial espionage
P. whereas part of the remit of foreign intelligence services is to
gather
economic data, such as details of developments in individual sectors of
the
economy, trends on commodity markets, compliance with economic
embargoes,
observance of rules on supplying dual-use goods, etc., and whereas, for
these
reasons, the firms concerned are often subject to surveillance,
Q. whereas the US intelligence services do not merely investigate
general
economic facts but also intercept detailed communications between
undertakings,
particularly where contracts are being awarded, and they justify this on

the grounds of combating attempted bribery; whereas detailed
interception
poses the risk that information may be used for the purpose of
competitive
intelligence-gathering rather than combating corruption, even though the

US and the United Kingdom state that they do not do so; whereas,
however,
the role of the Advocacy Centre of the US Trade Department is still not
totally
clear and talks arranged with the centre with a view to clarifying the
matter
were cancelled,
R. whereas an agreement on combating the bribery of officials was
adopted
within the framework of the OECD in 1997, under which bribery is
criminalised
at international level, and this provides a further reason why
individual
cases of bribery cannot justify the interception of communications,
S. whereas the situation becomes intolerable when intelligence services
allow
themselves to be used for purposes of gathering competitive intelligence

by spying on foreign firms with the aim of securing a competitive
advantage
for firms in the home country, and whereas it is frequently maintained
that
the global interception system has been used in this way, although no
such case has been substantiated,
T. whereas, during the visit of the Temporary Echelon Committee
Delegation
in the US, authoritative sources confirmed the US Congress Brown Report,

indicating that 5% of intelligence gathered via non-open sources is used

for economic intelligence; whereas it was estimated by the same sources
that
this intelligence surveillance could enable US industry to earn up to 7
billion dollars in terms of contracts,
</Text>
U. whereas sensitive commercial data are mostly kept inside individual
firms,
so that competitive intelligence-gathering in particular involves
efforts
to obtain information through members of staff or through people planted

in the firm for this purpose or else, more and more commonly,
by hacking into internal computer networks; whereas only if sensitive
data
are transmitted externally by cable or radio (satellite) can a
communications
surveillance system be used for competitive intelligence-gathering;
whereas
this applies systematically in the following three cases:
- in the case of firms which operate in three time zones, so that
interim
  results are sent from Europe to America and on to Asia;

- in the case of videoconferencing within multinationals using VSAT or
cable;

- if vital contracts are being negotiated on the spot (e.g. for the
building
  of plants, telecommunications infrastructure, the creation of new
transport
  systems, etc.) and it is necessary to consult the firm?s head office,
V. whereas risk and security awareness in small and medium-sized firms
is
often inadequate and the dangers of economic espionage and the
interception
of communications are not recognised,
W whereas security awareness is not always well developed in the
European
institutions (with the exception of the European Central Bank, the
Council
Directorate-General for External Relations and the Commission
Directorate-General
for external relations) and action is therefore necessary,
Possible self-protection measures
X. whereas firms can only make themselves secure by safeguarding their
entire
working environment and protecting all communications channels which are

used to send sensitive information; whereas sufficiently secure
encryption
systems exist at affordable prices on the European market; whereas
private
individuals should also be urged to encrypt e-mails; whereas an
unencrypted
e-mail message is like a letter without an envelope; whereas relatively
user-friendly systems exist on the Internet which are even made
available
for private use free of charge,
Cooperation among intelligence services within the EU
Y. whereas the EU has reached agreement on the coordination of
intelligence-gathering by intelligence services as part of the
development
of its own security and defence policy, although cooperation with other
partners
in these areas will continue,
Z. whereas the European Council has decided in December 1999 in Helsinki

to develop more effective European military capabilities to be able to
undertake
the full range of Petersberg tasks in support of the CFSP; whereas the
European
Council decided furthermore that in order to achieve this goal, by the
year
2003, the Union should be able to deploy rapidly troops of about 50,000
-
60,000 persons which should be self-sustaining, including the necessary
command,
control and intelligence capabilities; whereas the first steps towards
such
an autonomous intelligence capability have already been taken in the
framework
of the WEU and the standing Political and Security Committee,
AA. whereas cooperation among intelligence services within the EU seems
essential
on the grounds that, firstly, a common security policy which did not
involve
the secret services would not make sense, and, secondly, it would have
numerous professional, financial and political advantages; whereas it
would also accord
better with the idea of the EU as a partner on an equal footing with the

United States and could bring together all the Member States in a system

which complied fully with the ECHR; whereas the European Parliament
would
of course have to exercise appropriate monitoring,
AB. whereas the European Parliament is in the process of implementing
the
regulation on public access to European Parliament, Council and
Commission
documents by adapting its rules of procedure as regards access to
sensitive
documents,
Conclusion and amendment of international agreements on the protection
of citizens and firms
1. States, on the basis of the information obtained by the Temporary
Committee,
that the existence of a global system for intercepting communications,
operating
with the participation of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada,

Australia and New Zealand under the UKUSA Agreement, is no longer in
doubt;
2. Calls on the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe to submit to
the
Ministerial Committee a proposal to protect private life guaranteed in
Article
8 of the ECHR brought into line with modern communication and
interception
methods by means of an additional protocol or, together with the
provisions
governing data protection, as part of a revision of the Convention on
Data Protection, with the proviso that this should neither undermine the
level
of legal protection established by the European Court of Human Rights
nor
reduce the flexibility which is vital if future developments are to be
taken
into account;
3. Calls on the Member States ? whose laws governing the interception
capabilities of the secret services contain provisions on the protection

of privacy which are discriminatory ? to provide all European citizens
with the same legal guarantees concerning the protection of privacy and
the
confidentiality of correspondence;
4. Calls on the Member States of the European Union to establish a
European
platform consisting of representatives of the national bodies that are
responsible for monitoring the Member States? performance in complying
with fundamental and citizens? rights in order to scrutinise the
consistency
of the national legislations on intelligence services with the ECHR and
the EU Charter on fundamental rights, to review the legal provisions
guaranteeing
postal and communications secrecy, and, in addition, to reach agreement
on
a recommendation to the Member States on a Code of Conduct to be drawn
up
which guarantees all European citizens, throughout the territory of the
Member
States, protection of privacy as defined in Article 7 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union and which, moreover, guarantees

that the activities of intelligence services are carried out in a manner

consistent with fundamental rights, in keeping with the conditions set
out
in Chapter 8 of this report, and in particular Section 8.3.4., as
derived
from Article 8 of the ECHR;
5. Calls on the Member States to adopt the European Charter of
Fundamental
Rights as a legally binding and enforceable act at the next
Intergovernmental
Conference in order to raise the standard of protection for fundamental
rights,
particularly with regard to the protection of privacy;
6. Calls on the member countries of the Council of Europe to adopt an
additional
protocol which enables the European Communities to accede to the ECHR or

to consider other measures designed to prevent disputes relating to case

law arising between the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of
Justice
of the European Communities;
7. Urges the EU institutions in the meantime to apply the fundamental
rights
enshrined in the Charter within the scope of their respective powers and

activities;
8. Calls on the UN Secretary-General to instruct the competent committee

to put forward proposals designed to bring Article 17 of the
International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which guarantees the protection
of
privacy, into line with technical innovations;
9. Regards it as essential that an agreement should be negotiated and
signed
between the European Union and the United States stipulating that each
of
the two parties should observe, vis-à-vis the other, the provisions
governing the protection of the privacy of citizens and the
confidentiality
of business communications applicable to its own citizens and firms;
10. Calls on the USA to sign the Additional Protocol to the
International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, so that complaints by
individuals
concerning breaches of the Covenant by the USA can be submitted to the
Human
Rights Committee set up under the Covenant; calls on the relevant
American
NGOs, in particular the ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union) and the
EPIC
(Electronic Privacy Information Center), to exert pressure on the US
Administration to that end;
National legislative measures to protect citizens and firms
11. Urges the Member States to review and if necessary to adopt their
own
legislation on the operations of the intelligence services to ensure
that
it is consistent with fundamental rights as laid down in the ECHR and
with
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights;
12. Calls on the Member States to endow themselves with binding
instruments
which afford natural and legal persons effective protection against all
forms
of illegal interception of their communications;
13. Calls on the Member States to aspire to a common level of protection

against intelligence operations based on the highest level of protection

which exists in any Member State, since as a rule it is citizens of
other
states, and hence also of other Member States, that are affected by the
operations of foreign intelligence services;
14. Calls on the Member States to aspire to a common level of protection

against intelligence operations and to that end draw up a Code of
Conduct
(as mentioned in point 5) based on the highest level of protection which

exists in any Member State, since as a rule it is citizens of other
states,
and hence also of other Member States, that are affected by the
operations
of foreign intelligence services;
15. Calls on the Member States to negotiate with the USA a Code of
Conduct
similar to that of the EU;
16. Calls on those Member States which have not yet done so to guarantee

appropriate parliamentary and legal supervision of their secret
services;
17. Urges the Council and the Member States to establish as a matter of
priority
a system for the democratic monitoring and control of the autonomous
European
intelligence capability and for other joint and coordinated intelligence

activities at a European level; proposes that the European Parliament
should
play an important role in this monitoring and control system;
18. Calls on the Member States to pool their communications interception

resources with a view to enhancing the effectiveness of the CFSP in the
areas
of intelligence-gathering and the fight against terrorism, nuclear
proliferation
or international drug trafficking, in accordance with the provisions
governing
the protection of citizens? privacy and the confidentiality of business
communications, and subject to monitoring by the European Parliament,
the
Council and the Commission;
19. Calls on the Member States to conclude an agreement with third
countries
aimed at providing increased protection of privacy for EU citizens,
under
which all contracting states give a commitment, where one contracting
state
intercepts communications in another contracting state, to inform the
latter
of the planned actions;
Specific legal measures to combat industrial espionage
20. Calls on the Member States to consider to what extent industrial
espionage
and the payment of bribes as a means of securing contracts can be
combated
by means of European and international legal provisions and, in
particular,
whether WTO rules could be adopted which take account of the distortions

of competition brought about by such practices, for example by rendering

contracts obtained in this way null and void; calls on the United
States,
Australia, New Zealand and Canada to join this initiative;
21. Calls on the Member States to undertake to incorporate in the EC
Treaty
a clause prohibiting industrial espionage and not to engage in
industrial
espionage against one another, either directly or with the assistance of

a foreign power which might carry out operations on their territory, nor

to allow a foreign power to conduct espionage operations from the soil
of
an EU member state in order to comply with the letter and spirit of the
EC
Treaty;</Text>
22. Calls on the Member States to undertake by means of a clear and
binding
instrument not to engage in industrial espionage , thereby signifying
their
compliance with the letter and spirit of the EC Treaty; calls on the
Member
States to transpose this binding principle into their national
legislation
on intelligence services,
23. Calls on the Member States and the US government to start an open
US-EU
dialogue on economic intelligence gathering;
Measures concerning the implementation of the law and the monitoring
of that implementation
24. Calls on the national parliaments which have no parliamentary
monitoring
body responsible for scrutinising the activities of the intelligence
services
to set up such a body;
25. Calls on the monitoring bodies responsible for scrutinising the
activities
of the secret services, when exercising their monitoring powers, to
attach
great importance to the protection of privacy, regardless of whether the

individuals concerned are their own nationals, other EU nationals or
third-country nationals;
26. Calls on the Member States to make sure that their intelligence
systems
are not misused for the purposes of gathering competitive intelligence,
contrary
to Member States? duty of loyalty and with the concept of a common
market
based on free competition;
27. Calls on Germany and the United Kingdom to make the authorisation of

further communications interception operations by US intelligence
services
on their territory conditional on their compliance with the ECHR, i.e.
to
stipulate that they should be consistent with the principle of
proportionality,
that their legal basis should be accessible and that the implications
for
individuals should be foreseeable, and to introduce corresponding,
effective
monitoring measures, since they are responsible for ensuring that
intelligence
operations authorised or even merely tolerated on their territory
respect
human rights;
Measures to encourage self-protection by citizens and firms
28. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to inform their
citizens
and enterprises about the possibility that their international
communications
may, under certain circumstances, be intercepted; insist that this
information
will be accompanied by practical assistance in designing and
implementing
comprehensive protection measures, including the security of information
technology;
29. Calls on the Commission, the Council and the Member States to
develop
and implement an effective and active policy for Security in the
Information
Society; insists that in the framework of this policy specific attention

will be given to increase the awareness of all users of modern
communication
systems to protect confidential information; furthermore insists on the
establishment of a European-wide and coordinated network of agencies,
which
are capable to provide practical assistance in designing and
implementing
comprehensive protection strategies;
30. Urges the Commission and Member States to devise appropriate
measures
to promote, develop and manufacture European encryption technology and
software
and above all to support projects aimed at developing user-friendly
open-source encryption software;
31. Calls on the Commission and Member States to promote software
projects
whose source text is made public (open-source software), as this is the
only
way of guaranteeing that no backdoors are built into programmes;
32. Calls on the Commission and Member States to promote software
projects
whose source text is made public (open-source software), as this is the
only
way of guaranteeing that no back doors are built into programmes; calls
on
the Commission to lay down a standard for the level of security of
e-mail
software packages, placing those packages whose source code has not been
made public in the least reliable category;
33. Calls on the European institutions and the public administrations of

the Member States systematically to encrypt e-mails, so that ultimately
encryption becomes the norm;
34. Calls on the Community institutions and the public administrations
of
the Member States to provide training for their staff and make their
staff
familiar with new encryption technologies and techniques by means of the

necessary practical training and courses;
35. Calls for particular attention to be paid to the position of the
applicant
countries; urges that they should be given support, since their lack of
technological independence prevents them from implementing the requisite

protective measures;
Other measures
36. Calls on firms to cooperate more closely with counter-espionage
services,
and particularly to inform them of attacks from outside for the purposes

of industrial espionage, in order to improve the services? efficiency;
37. Instructs the Commission to have a security analysis carried out
which
will show what needs to be protected, and to have a protection strategy
drawn
up;
38. Calls on the Commission to update its encryption system in line with

the latest developments, given that modernisation is urgently needed,
and
calls on the budgetary authorities (the Council together with
Parliament)
to provide the necessary funding;
39. Calls on the Committee on Citizens' Freedoms and Rights, Justice and

Home Affairs to draw up an own-initiative report on security and the
protection
of secrecy in the European institutions;
40. Calls on the Commission to ensure that data is protected in its own
data
processing systems and to intensify the protection of secrecy in
relation
to documents not accessible to the public;
41. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to invest in new
technologies
in the field of decryption and encryption techniques as part of the
Sixth
Research Framework Programme;
42. Urges states which have been placed at a disadvantage by distortions

of competition resulting from state support for or the economic misuse
of
espionage to inform the authorities and monitoring bodies of the state
from
which the activities were undertaken so that they can put a stop to the
operations in question;
43. Calls on the Commission to put forward a proposal to establish in
close
cooperation with industry and the Member States a European-wide and
coordinated
network of advisory centres - in particular in those Member States
where such centres do not yet exist -, to deal with issues relating to
the
security of the information held by firms, with the twin task of
increasing
awareness of the problem and providing practical assistance;
44. Takes the view that an international congress on the protection of
privacy
against telecommunications surveillance should be held in order to
provide
NGOs from Europe, the USA and other countries with a forum for
discussion
of the cross-border and international aspects of the problem and
coordination
of areas of activity and action;
45. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council,
the
Commission, the Secretary-General and Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council
of Europe, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and
applicant
countries, the United States, Australia, New Zealand and Canada.


______________________________________________________________________
To unsubscribe, write to infowar -
 de-unsubscribe -!
- listbot -
 com